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I am here today not because I am an expert in international human rights
law, but because I am a judge who has written an opinion which refers to
that source of law. I suppose I am here more in the nature of an exhibit
than as a person who is going to teach you any law. You can take what I
say as illustrative of what you may face in actually talking to a domestic
court about international human rights law.
I commend Professor Hoffman and Ms. de la Vega on their excellent
presentations. When I discuss many of the same concepts that they have
already discussed from a somewhat different perspective and with greater
skepticism, this should not be regarded as disagreement with their under-
standing of the law. Rather, I intend to offer you some insight on what you
may encounter from the other side of the bench.
Out there in the world of people who have not had the good fortune to
attend conferences on international human rights law, it is largely taken as
an article of faith that the United States provides the best protection for
human rights in the world. If there are any rights recognized in interna-
tional law that are not recognized in U.S. law, people may assume that
there is a good reason for that nonrecognition. On the other hand, whether
or not our protection of human rights is the best, there is a strong urge to
agree that it should be the best. These ingrained perspectives give you both
an opportunity and a challenge.
You may as well assume, simply as a matter of probability, that these
views also are likely to prevail among the judges you will face. If we judges
have not yet decided to recognize a certain right under one of the numer-
ous, elastic clauses that are available to courts in this country, we probably
believe that there is a good reason why we haven't. A lawyer who comes to
tell us that we should follow some principle because it is part of an evolving
body of international human rights law has a lot of explaining to do. But
we also take pride in American law as being in the lead on individual
human rights. These attitudes, I think, are important in understanding
what role international human rights materials can play in domestic courts.
It is potentially a powerful argument to say to a court that a right which
is guaranteed by an American constitutional provision, state or federal,
surely does not fall short of a standard adopted by other civilized nations.
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It is a much more difficult, and riskier, argument to tell a court that it
must displace some law of a state, or of the United States, with an external
international standard.
A lawyer considering the use of international human rights law in a
national court, state or federal, must consider carefully whether he or she
means to claim the international document as a source of standards for the
proper application of the nation's own law, or as a source of legally binding
obligations. A lawyer must tell a court clearly whether he or she is asserting
a claim under international law, or presenting an international norm in sup-
port of a desired interpretation of our domestic law.
To point to the international standard as a goal or an achievement to be
matched may prove very successful. To point to it as an external law to be
obeyed may backfire. It may backfire because, unless the legally binding
nature of the international source is clear and strong, opposing counsel and
the court may give more time and attention to refuting the claim that the
international source has binding force than to looking at the substance of
the human rights in question.
The use of human rights norms as customary international law, so ably
outlined by Ms. de la Vega, is undeniably appealing. Here we have docu-
ments full of more or less eloquent and powerful language, adopted in
many cases by unanimous vote in the United Nations, the Organization of
American States, or the European Commission on Human Rights. Emi-
nent authorities, including Frank Newman, Louis Sohn, Louis Henkin, and
Anthony D'Amato, have devoted a great deal of very able effort to showing
(1) that the "pledge" made by U.N. members under article 56 of the charter
to take separate as well as joint action in cooperation with the organization
to promote human rights created an obligation binding on the United
States, and (2) that the aggregate international bill of human rights offers an
authoritative, or at least persuasive, interpretation of the article 56
obligation.
I have little problem with those separate conclusions. Assuming they are
correct, nevertheless, they are insufficient to establish the direct applicabil-
ity of international documents in domestic courts. Incantation of the classic
formula that the law of nations is part of the law of the United States,
referred to by both Professor Hoffman and Connie de la Vega, by itself is
not enough to establish that even the most widely accepted norms of human
rights law displace American law in American courts.
The U.N. Charter, of course, is a treaty and part of the "supreme law of
the land." But the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was deliber-
ately drafted not to be a treaty. Other human rights documents that were
drafted to be treaties or covenants have not been ratified by the United
States. These have been deliberate governmental decisions not to under-
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take certain legal obligations, made with full attention to the choices among
instruments that are designed to create one or the other legal effect.
The problem in establishing that a provision of an international docu-
ment binds our courts as domestic law is that you must show a decision on
the part of our government to be so bound. And you cannot show such an
intention regarding any instrument other than treaties or similar formal
agreements. Other declarations and draft conventions are entered into sim-
ply by presidential instructions to ambassadors. They reflect no more than
a presidential decision that a certain stance in one of the international
forums, or a particular speech, or a vote for a specific declaration advances
the foreign policy interests of the United States. Presidents generally do not
mean to make domestic law by these means. Ordinarily they take great
care to reassure everyone, including the Congress, that they are not making
any law binding on this country by voting for or even signing international
human rights documents. Even when a President has signed a draft con-
vention that is intended to be a proposed treaty, he or his successor often
has decided not to submit the convention for the advice and consent of the
Senate, or perhaps to submit it with the explicit reservation that the ratified
treaty would have no domestic effect.
For instance, Dean Rusk, who worked with Eleanor Roosevelt in her
efforts to have the Universal Declaration of Human Rights unanimously
adopted, wrote in a recent article that it was perfectly well understood at the
time that the signing of the declaration would have no legal consequences
within the United States.'
The President has no delegated constitutional power to define the human
rights of people in American courts by his unilateral act. Even if the duty
of members of the United Nations to cooperate with the U.N. in human
rights matters can be exercised by the president alone without participation
by the Congress in matters within his powers, the president has not pur-
ported to make domestic law by any such agreement, as Secretary Rusk
pointed out. The possibility that a president might claim such a power was
the driving force behind the Bricker amendment proposed by isolationists
thirty years ago and debated in Congress and among lawyers for several
years.
Human rights enthusiasts understandably welcome any theory that
promises to promote human rights without too much scrutiny of its implica-
tions. But the trouble with theory is that it always extends beyond the
immediate case. We have learned to be cautious about unilateral executive
power to act in domestic affairs, say, to settle a labor dispute by seizing the
steel industry. Why should the executive have more domestic power by




agreeing with other governments, say, to assure equal employment rights in
the steel industry? If the president can make human rights law for the
United States by having an ambassador make a speech, negotiate a declara-
tion, or cast a vote in the General Assembly, can he make other kinds of
American law by the same means? Could he, for instance, act on his own to
override the property law of the states and transfer property from one
claimant to another?
The Supreme Court's case law actually shows this ambivalence. The Bel-
mon!2 and Pink3 decisions around 1940 held that President Roosevelt could
change the law governing bank deposits in New York in the course of
agreeing to recognize the Soviet government in 1933. By taking an assign-
ment of Soviet claims to Russian assets in New York, the president appar-
ently could deprive other Russians, perhaps White Russian refugees living
in Paris or in Shanghai, of whatever property they had under New York
law. The argument that this took private property without just compensa-
tion was met with the answer that "our Constitution. . .has no extraterri-
torial operation, unless in respect of our own citizens."'4 The Litvinov
assignment may have been good foreign policy, but it sheds another light
on making domestic human rights law by executive foreign policy declara-
tions, in or out of the United Nations.
I would be concerned if the president, by making a speech or signing a
declaration or even a proposed convention could, for instance, commit
states to expend money to assure certain educational or other rights, in der-
ogation of the states' own laws. Such a shift of the taxing power from the
states to the president would represent a major restructuring of the constitu-
tional allocation of power. I have no doubt that the United States could
commit itself to expend money by ratification of a treaty. But this is far
from empowering a court to mandate a state to spend money in order to
help the United States achieve some general treaty goal, even at the wish of
the national executive. That depends on the issue, addressed by Ms. de la
Vega, when a treaty is designed to be self-executing.
In short, if you are to succeed with your argument that a provision of
human rights law is law in a domestic court, you must be able to show that
the national lawmakers, by treaty or otherwise, intended this effect. This, at
least, is the kind of skeptical reaction that a lawyer is likely to meet if he or
she tries to convince a court to apply purely declaratory international
human rights documents as legally binding on the court. But often there is
no need to take on that burden.
If instead, you argue that a court should look to international instruments
to assist it in interpreting a domestic statute or constitution, then you are
2U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937)-Ed.
3U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942)-Ed.
'U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937)-Ed.
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asking the court to do what it is empowered to do and using international
law in the process. Moreover, an advocate wishing to invoke international
human rights norms reasonably could argue that an applicable domestic
law already contains the protections that the claimant contends, but that, if
the court were not to accept this view, then the court might well find itself
running afoul of national policy as expressed by the United States govern-
ment through its participation in international human rights activities and
declarations.5
As I said at the outset, Americans, and especially the legal profession, are
-prepared to believe that our own bills of rights, state or federal, embody just
about any human right worth mentioning. Those bills of rights also contain
clauses that some courts have considered elastic enough to stretch over a lot
of territory. So if a court is persuaded of the merits of a particular human
rights claim, the court almost certainly can recognize that claim under a
clause of a state constitution or of the federal constitution without venturing
onto the thin ice of making doubtful precedents about the domestic effects
of executive declarations in international forums.
I venture a guess that arguments invoking international human rights
standards would have the greatest chance of success in matters where the
claim invokes an issue of international interest, or where other countries
and international agencies have had greater experience than has the United
States. Examples may include the treatment of aliens, the legal status and
rights of diverse racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious and nationality groups,
and the treatment of detained persons.
6
In conclusion, I want to leave you with a theme that for twenty years has
been a favorite of Frank Newman's and mine, and that Paul Hoffman also
mentioned; namely, that it is a grave mistake to think that courts are the
only forums in which human rights law is made or developed. The harder,
less immediately rewarding, but more important pursuit of international
human rights, as of other policies, occurs not in the courts, but in persuad-
ing those responsible for policymaking, in the Congress, the State Depart-
ment, and the White House that Americans care about human rights
abroad as well as at home. The fact that so many of you have turned out
for Southwestern's conference is impressive evidence of the continuing
interest in our human rights policies.
'Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 88 S. Ct. 664, 19 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1968)reh. denied 390 U.S.
974, 88 S. Ct. 1018, 19 L. Ed. 2d. 1196 (1968)-Ed.
'Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981)--Ed.
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